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There is a long tradition in philosophy and literary criticism of belief in the social and moral
benefits of exposure to fiction, and recent empirical work has examined some of these
claims. However, little of this research has addressed the textual features responsible for
the hypothesized cognitive effects. We present two experiments examining whether
readers’ social and moral cognition are influenced by the perspective from which a
narrative is told (voice and focalization), and whether potential effects of perspective
are mediated by transportation into the story or by identification with the protagonist. Both
experiments employed a between-subjects design in which participants read a short story,
either in the first-person voice using internal focalization, third-person voice using internal
focalization, or third-person voice using external focalization. Social and moral cognition
was assessed using a battery of tasks. Experiment 1 (N  258) failed to detect any effects
of perspective or any mediating roles of transportation or identification. Implementing a
more rigorous adaptation of the third-person story using external focalization, Experiment
2 (N  262) largely replicated this pattern. Taken together, the evidence reported here
suggests that perspective does not have a significant impact on the extent to which
narratives modulate social and moral cognition, either directly or indirectly via
transportation and identification.
Keywords: morality, focalization, perspective, identification, social cognition, fiction, narrative
INTRODUCTION
Narrative fictions in variousmedia and genres have long been regarded by humanistic scholars as educative,
either through their embodiment of moral principles (Johnson, 1750) or their capacity to make us more
sensitive to the needs and outlooks of others (Nussbaum, 1990; Nussbaum, 1995). Only very recently have
such claims been subject to empirical test, where there has been a particular focus on the relation between
narrative fiction and improvements in social cognition (overview: Dodell-Feder and Tamir, 2018). However,
narrative fiction is a broad and heterogeneous category, raising the question of whether and why some texts
might have more influence than others. In this paper we address this question by examining the role played
by a specific textual feature, narrative perspective, on social and moral cognition.
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Social cognition is defined as the perception, interpretation
and use of social information, and comprises a set of abilities that
we draw on daily to manage social relationships in a variety of
situations (Fiske and Taylor, 2013). It includes affective empathy
(i.e., tuning into other peoples’ feelings or thoughts; Baron-Cohen and
Wheelwright, 2004; Singer and Klimecki, 2014), Theory of Mind
(ToM; understanding others’mental states;Wellman et al., 2001), and
emotion recognition (i.e., the perception of others’ emotional states;
Brühne, 2005; Frith and Frith, 1999). The promotion of social
cognition seems crucial not only in view of empirical evidence that
understanding others facilitates everyday social interactions (e.g.,
Watson et al., 1999; Leppänen and Hietanen, 2001; Findlay et al.,
2006), but also in light of evidence suggesting that deficits in both
affective empathy and ToM are associated with mental health
disorders, such as autism spectrum disorder (Baron-Cohen, 2000;
Hobson, 2007) and schizophrenia (Lee, 2007; Bora et al., 2009).
Furthermore, the cultivation of affective empathy and ToM are
often regarded as essential for moral education (Dolby, 2012;
Nussbaum, 1995; for a contrary view see Bialystok and Kukar,
2018). In recent years, researchers have become increasingly
interested in testing whether social and moral cognition can be
improved by reading fictional narratives (Calarco et al., 2017). In
this paper we address this question, but we go further by testing
whether effects on social and moral cognition are modulated by the
narrative perspective in a fictional story.
Many empirical researchers favor the idea that reading
narratives is associated with enhanced social cognition. Several
lines of thought make that a plausible view. Stories are typically
about characters and their social interactions; hence readers must
apply their social cognition, including affective empathy and
ToM, in order to understand narratives (e.g., Calarco et al.,
2017; Salem et al., 2017; Deane et al., 2019; Mar, 2018a; Mar,
2018b). Furthermore, the social content of (fictional) narratives
frequently broadens the scope of social information individuals are
exposed to by describing experiences they would not have in real life,
or by presenting events from novel perspectives (Calarco et al., 2017).
In addition written narratives provide a safe environment to practice
social cognition since, unlike in real life, readers can re-read passages
several times in order to make sense of social situations, and
misunderstandings do not result in adverse consequences for the
reader or anyone else (Mar and Oatley, 2008). Tentative support for
the proposal that reading stories promotes social cognition comes
from twometa-analyses that have summarized effects of reading short
fictional narratives on social cognition (Dodell-Feder and Tamir,
2018) and associations of lifetime exposure to fictional narratives
with social cognition (Mumper and Gerrig, 2017). However, the
aggregate effect sizes reported in both meta-analyses are small,
with some experiments failing to detect any effects of reading short
fictional stories at all (e.g., Panero et al., 2016; Samur et al., 2018). This
inconsistent pattern of findings might be explained by the fact that
different studies focus on different categories of text (e.g., fiction vs
nonfiction, or literary vs popular fiction) and/or psychological
mechanisms (e.g., transportation, imagery generation) presumed to
be responsible for effects on social cognition (Deane et al., 2019). Texts
in different categories differ along multiple dimensions, leaving it
unclear which features might be responsible for any effects; and
psychological mechanisms may also be triggered by a variety of
text characteristics. To find out whether and why certain fictional
narratives enhance social cognition, a targeted investigation of text
features and their relationship to psychological mechanisms is needed.
Two psychological mechanisms that have been proposed to
underlie narrative-based social cognitive benefits are identification
and transportation (see Consoli, 2018). Identification refers to the
process of taking a character’s perspective in light of that character’s
beliefs, values, and goals (Van Krieken et al., 2017). Transportation1 is
“the experience of being imaginatively carried away into the story
world” (Gerrig, 1993, as cited in Deane et al., 2019). Although
transportation and identification are empirically distinguishable
concepts (Tal-Or and Cohen, 2010; Tal-Or and Cohen, 2016), the
processes seem towork synergistically, so that transportation facilitates
identification and vice versa (Calarco et al., 2017). In particular,
transportation is thought to reduce the psychological distance
between readers and story characters, which in turn facilitates the
reader’s ability to take the character’s perspective, share their emotions,
and understand their (inter-)actions (Calarco et al., 2017; Consoli,
2018). Both identification and transportation appear to enhance social
cognition. Identification is itself an exercise ofmentalizing/ToM, while
empirical evidence has supported a link between transportation into a
narrative and enhanced social cognition beyond the story world
(Johnson, 2012; Johnson, 2013; Bal and Veltkamp, 2013;
Walkington et al., 2019). Therefore, we have good reason to think
that transportation and identification mediate the relationship
between reading narratives and social cognition.
Transportation and identification are themselves mediated,
at least in part, by features of the text. Previous work that has
focused on the role of textual determinants has highlighted the
importance of “privileged access to the perceptions, evaluations, and
goals of a character” as a centralmechanism throughwhich readers are
transported into the protagonists’ world and identify themselves with
characters (van Krieken et al., 2017, p.4). Writers can vary this level of
access by altering the perspective or point of view from which a
narrative is told (van Krieken, 2018). Narrative perspective is a multi-
dimensional construct (cf. Hühn et al., 2009). Two dimensions are
especially relevant to how the inner life of a character is presented;
Genette, 1980 called these voice and focalization. Voice concerns who
tells the story, which inmost narrativeswill be afirst-personnarrator or
a third-personnarrator, and is typically reflected in the grammatical use
of certain pronouns. Focalization concerns the perspective or point of
view of the narrator and specifies restrictions on access to information.
For instance, when a story is narrated in the first person by a particular
character, the narration is often restricted to what the character
knows, including their thoughts and feelings. However,
narrative voice and focalization are independent. Third-person
narrators may tell a story from an unrestricted (“omniscient”)
point of view, with broad access; or a more restricted perspective,
either through what Genette called internal focalization (where the
narrator has access to what a particular character knows and
experiences) or external focalization (where the narrator does
not have access to the character’s thoughts or experiences). The
following passages, both in third-person voice, illustrate the
1Some researchers (e.g., Calarco et al., 2017) use the term absorption
synonymously.
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distinction between internal focalization (1) and external
focalization (2):
(1) Sarah looked at her daughter. She knew she had been like this
as a child, sometimes. But why did Amy always have to act
this way? Couldn’t she see how much it hurt?
(2) Sarah looked at her daughter. She frowned, and said, “I was
like you sometimes when I was a child. But why do you always
have to act this way? Can’t you see how much it hurts?”
In (1), readers have direct access to the mental life of the
protagonist (Sarah), whereas in (2) the scene is described from the
point of view of an external observer without direct access to Sarah’s
mental life. Because focalization is what determines the extent to
which the narrator offers insight into a character’s inner life, it appears
more relevant to transportation and identification than voice.
Although Genette’s distinction between narrative voice and
focalization has initiated an animated discussion among
narratologists (see e.g., Fludernik, 2001; Margolin, 2009; Currie
2010), empirical investigations have almost exclusively studied
manipulations of voice, assuming that this is sufficient for testing
perspective (e.g., Van Lissa et al., 2016; Hartung et al., 2017b; Creer
et al., 2019; Kim et al., 2019; Samur et al., 2020). So far, only one
empirical study has investigated the effects of focalization or
perspective as distinct from voice. Salem et al. (2017) compared
first-person narration (internally focalized); third-person external
focalization; and two forms of third-person internal focalization:
psycho-narration, in which the narrator reports the thoughts of the
protagonist (e.g., “She worried about her children”), and free indirect
discourse (FID), which stays closer to the protagonist’s subjectivity
(e.g., “What would happen to her children?”). (Example (1) above
contains both.). Results indicated that focalization had effects on
perspective-taking independently of narrative voice, suggesting that
focalization is indeed more important for processes relevant to
identification and, hence, possibly social cognition in the real world.
However, targeted investigations are needed that manipulate
voice and focalization separately and assess both proximal effects,
i.e., processes of transportation and identification with characters,
and distal outcomes, i.e., general social cognition. In sum, (internal
vs. external) focalization is thought to exert a greater influence on
transportation and identification than (first- vs third-person) voice.
As a consequence of this influence, internally focalized narratives
are expected to lead to greater benefits for social cognition than
externally focalized narratives, regardless of narrative voice.2
A related question is whether manipulations of perspective
might have an effect on moral cognition. Theorists in the
humanities have traditionally argued that reading (fictional)
stories has the capacity to generate moral improvement (e.g.,
Nussbaum, 1990; Nussbaum, 1995), but there is a paucity of
experimental evidence to support this claim. The few existing
investigations (Johnson et al., 2013; Koopman, 2015; Kidd and
Castano, 2019) provide somewhat suggestive findings; however
none of them has examined the ways in which textual features
might influence moral cognition. Reading narratives might be
assumed to benefit moral cognition via at least two routes.
The first route is via an increase of social cognition, as
outlined above (Koopman, 2015). Nussbaum (2001) suggests
that “tragic fictions promote extension of concern by linking
the imagination powerfully to the adventures of the distant life
in question” (p. 352). The idea is that through empathetic
sharing of characters’ mental states, readers enlarge their
capacity for imaginative contact with the thoughts, feelings
and intentions of others in real-life. This may have multiple
effects: increasing readers’ compassion, being more aware of
the impact of their own actions on others’ welfare, and, by
providing them with better information about motives and
intentions, allowing them to make better, more sophisticated
moral judgements about the actions of others (Killen et al.,
2011; Ugazio et al., 2014). Insofar as moral cognition is
assumed to improve as a result of narrative-based
improvements in social cognition, which are expected to
rely on internal (vs external) focalization, internal
focalization should also generate improvements in moral
cognition. It is, however, agreed that improving social-
cognitive abilities does not automatically lead to morally
better outcomes; while empathy is often associated with
prosocial virtues, it can be used for manipulation and
deception (e.g. Bloom, 2017; Breithaupt, 2018; Bubandt and
Willerslev, 2015; Vermeule, 2010; see also Sutton et al., 1999).
Therefore, improvement of social cognition cannot be
considered a sufficient condition of moral improvement –
enhanced social cognition does not guarantee moral
progress. Yet it may be that readers who are appropriately
motivated can utilize the social knowledge gained from
narratives to become morally better people. If so, the effect
is expected to be modulated by focalization.
The second route is more direct, via observational learning
(Johnson et al., 2013; Mumper and Gerrig, 2019; Black and
Barnes, 2020a). According to this view, readers can learn
morally positive attitudes and behaviors when a story
character is rewarded for a morally positive action or
punished for a morally negative action; and identification
with the character can increase the likelihood of executing
an observed behavior. Since identification is thought to depend
on internal (vs. external) focalization, this is another way in
which manipulating focalization can generate changes in
moral cognition. If readers internalize such pattern of
reward blindly, however, without gaining insight into
universal principles of ethical conduct, they could be
equally likely to learn morally negative attitudes and
behaviors when a story character is rewarded for a morally
2Whilst we predict that the more direct access to characters’ inner life bestowed by
the internal perspective facilitates transportation, identification, and ultimately
social cognition, other researchers have assumed that having additional
information about mental states reduces (or does at least not enhance) readers’
understanding of those states. However, these studies have focused on explicit
information provided by a narrator. For instance, Kotovych et al., 2011 observed
support for their hypothesis that character transparency, that is, the extent to which
the character’s actions and attitudes are clear and understandable, is reduced when
information about a character is explicitly stated compared to when readers must
infer such details. Furthermore, results of Peskin and Astington (2004) suggest that
social cognitive abilities are promoted if readers have to work out the mental lives
of fictional characters themselves, compared to when mental states are spelled out
for the readers.
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negative action or punished for a morally positive action.
Reading narratives would therefore lead to a “moral
boundary erosion” (Black and Barnes, 2020a). Yet there is
some reason to believe that reading narratives operates as a
“moral laboratory” (Hakemulder, 2000), leading to increased
moral sensitivity rather than the opposite. Typically, readers
prefer narratives in which good behavior is presented as
preferable to bad behavior (Raney, 2004). Also, readers have
been found to report an inability to imaginatively engage with
immoral fictional worlds, a phenomenon known as
“imaginative resistance” (overview: Black and Barnes,
2020b). In another study by Vezzali et al. (2015), reading a
passage from Harry Potter about prejudice improved attitudes
toward immigrants for those who identified with Harry Potter,
whereas there was no effect for those who identified more with
Voldemort, the villain; this suggests that identification is more
likely to improve than impair moral cognition. For these
reasons, reading internally (vs. externally) focalized
narratives is expected to lead not only to greater
improvements in social cognition, but also in moral
cognition, in both cases via increases of transportation and
identification.
Here we report two experiments that investigated whether
social and moral cognition are affected by the perspective from
which a fictional narrative is told. We considered both voice
(first- vs third-person) and point of view (internal vs. external
focalization). We also looked at potential mediating effects of
transportation into the story world and identification with the
protagonist. In Experiment 1, we employed a between-subjects
design in which participants read a complete short story by an
established author either in its original version, i.e., a third-
person narrative using internal focalization (specifically, FID);
an adapted version telling the narrative in first-person voice
using internal focalization; or an adapted version telling the
narrative in third-person voice using external focalization, as
pre-registered in the Open Science Framework. Social
cognition was assessed in terms of emotion recognition, as
indicated by the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test-Revised
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), and ToM, as indicated by the
Frith-Happé animations task (Abell et al., 2000). Two basic
self-concepts that have been associated with moral behavior
are, respectively, communion and agency (Bakan, 1966).
Communion is associated with allocentric behaviors, since it
is related to cultivating social relationships and pro-social
traits including cooperation, while agency is associated with
egocentric behaviors, since it is linked with distancing the
self from others and anti-social traits including
assertiveness (Bakan, 1966; Bartz and Lydon, 2004). We
assessed these two self-concepts implicitly using a word-
fragment completion task, which indicated ease of access to
the respective concepts (Bartz and Lydon, 2004). In
addition, the Immediate Affect towards Moral Stimuli
task reflected participants’ affective reactions towards
morally positive/negative stimuli, which have been
associated with guilt feelings in a moral dilemma, and
with emotional reactions to/rejection of an unfair offer
(Hofmann and Baumert, 2010). Finally, an Implicit
Association Test (IAT) measured participants’ moral vs.
immoral self-concept, which predicts moral actions such
as honest behavior despite negative consequences (Perugini
and Leone, 2009).
Experiment 2 used the same basic design and internal
focalization text versions as Experiment 1, but the version with
external focalization was edited even further to strengthen the
focalization manipulation. Figure 1 provides a schematic
representation of the predicted relationships between the
variables of interest and how these were operationalized. Note
that although transportation and identification likely influence
each other, the interrelation between the two variables is not at
the core of the research questions addressed here, and thus we did
not make specific hypotheses about how a combination of
transportation and identification might mediate the relationship
FIGURE 1 | Predicted relationships between the variables of interest and their operationalization.
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between text reading and social/moral cognition. Table 1 presents
an overview and justification of dependent variables, their
operationalization, and their use in previous experiments on
narrative-based benefits for social and moral cognition.
The following hypotheses were tested in both experiments:
(1) Measures of social and moral cognition would be higher after
reading a narrative told through internal focalization than
external focalization.
(2) The voice (first- vs. third-person) in which a narrative is told
would not per se influence social cognition. Therefore, social
cognition would not differ after reading narratives told in
different voices as long as focalization was held constant
between stories.
(3) Reading narratives achieves benefits in social and moral
cognition via transportation into the narrative and
identification with characters. Thus, we expected effects of
story reading on social and moral cognition to be mediated by
transportation and identification with the story’s protagonist.
EXPERIMENT 1
Materials and Methods
All methodological procedures were approved by the Research
Ethics Committee of the School of Psychology at the University of
Kent, United Kingdom, prior to commencement, and pre-
registered on the Open Science Framework, https://osf.io/
wpd2c. The experiment followed a between-subjects design
involving one randomized factor with three levels of text
(first-person voice with internal focalization vs third-person
voice with internal focalization vs third-person voice with
external focalization). First-person voice with external
focalization was not realized since this would have required an
unacceptable level of distortion to the original story, either by
removing the content referring to the protagonist’s mental life
altogether, which would have made this story version much
shorter than the remaining versions, or by replacing this type
of content with something else, which again would have
substantially reduced comparability with the three other story
versions. Furthermore, narratives using first-person voice with
external focalization can occur, but are extremely rare (Genette,
1983; Edmiston, 1989); thus, this textual condition does not seem
of high practical relevance and would likely have come across as
artificial to readers.
Participants
Participants were recruited through Prolific Academic and were
paid £6.00. All participants had English as their primary language,
and provided written informed consent before data collection. We
used the software program G*Power to conduct an a-priori power
analysis, aiming for 0.95 power to detect a medium effect size of f 
0.25 at the standard 0.05 alpha error probability. This resulted in a
total N of 251. Allowing for a dropout rate of approx. 33% (as
observed in previous studies, e.g., Kidd and Castano, 2019), we
TABLE 1 | Overview and justification of dependent variables, their operationalization, and their use in previous experiments on narrative-based benefits for social and moral
cognition.
Outcome Justification for investigating
outcome
Operationalization Justification for using
operationalization







Mar (2018a) predicts that stories containing
accurate social content can teach lessons about
human psychology including emotional expression
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test
(RMET; Baron-Cohen et al. (2001))
• Oakley et al. (2016) suggested that the RMET
measures emotion recognition
• This task has been applied widely in previous research,
which facilitates comparison with existing findings
Yes e.g., Djikic et al. (2013), Kidd and Castano (2013),
Kidd and Castano (2019), Black and Barnes (2015), Liu
and Want (2015), Kidd et al. (2016), Panero et al.
(2016), and Samur et al. (2018)
Theory of
Mind (ToM)
Mar (2018a) suggests that stories that provide
access to protagonists’ inner life exercises ToM
Frith-Happé animations task by
White et al. (2011)
• This task draws on people’s tendency to attribute
human psychology to silent moving shapes
• This task has been used as a reliable measure of
ToM in adults (White et al. (2011)): High levels of
ToM are suggested if participants correctly
recognize mental interactions between animated
shapes
No
Moral cognition Theorists in the humanities have traditionally
argued that reading (fictional) stories has the
capacity to generate global moral improvement
across a range of components of moral cognition
(e.g., Nussbaum (1990), Nussbaum (1995))
Word completion task introduced
by Bartz and Lydon (2004)
• This task provides an implicit way of assessing
moral cognition that reduces susceptibility to social
desirability
• It indicates the ease of access to morally relevant
concepts (Bartz and Lydon (2004)), namely
communion (related to cultivating social
relationships and pro-social traits) and agency
(linked with distancing the self from others and anti-
social traits)
No
Implicit affect towards moral stimuli
task (IAMS task; Hofmann and
Baumert (2010))
• This task reflects affective reactions towards morally
positive/negative stimuli
• Performance in this task has been associated with
guilt feelings in a moral dilemma, and with emotional
reactions to/rejection of an unfair offer (Hofmann
and Baumert (2010))
No
Implicit moral identity IAT • This task measures moral vs. immoral self-concept
• Performance in this task predicts moral actions such
as honest behavior despite negative consequences
(Perugini and Leone (2009))
• This task has proven to be a better predictor of real-
life action than measures of explicit attitudes
(Perugini and Leone (2009))
No
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aimed to recruit a total N of 340 to yield the target of N  252 (84
per group). Power analysis further showed that a total sample size
ofN  252 would have a power of 0.99 to detect mediation, given a
medium size effect and 5% significance level. This sample size
would have a power of 0.61 to detect a small effect.
Participants were excluded from analyses if they met at least
one of the following criteria: 1) First language was not English; 2)
reading time was below 360s3; 3) failed a check of text
comprehension by indicating that the story was told by an
anonymous narrator after reading the internal first-person
version of the story, OR that the story was told by the mother,
Marjorie (the protagonist) after reading the external third-person
version of the story; 4) more than twomock authors were selected
in the Author Recognition Test–Genres (Mar and Rain, 2015; cf.
Wimmer et al., submitted)4; 5) failed an attention check item that
was interspersed within a questionnaire (Transportation Scale;
Green and Brock, 2000).
The target sample was reached after 347 volunteers. When
exclusion criteria were applied, 258 participants remained in the
final sample, 87 of whom had read the first-person narrative with
internal focalization (54.0% female, mean age  36.55, SD of age 
14.01), 87 of whom had read the third-person narrative with
internal focalization (52.9% female, mean age  33.69, SD of age 
10.41), and 84 of whom had read the third-person narrative with
external focalization (56.0% female, mean age  35.00, SD of age 
12.16). See Figure 2 for a schematic of the flow of participants
through the experiment.
Reading Stimuli
Three versions of Rose Tremain’s “The Closing Door”, a
complete short story about a widow seeing off her 10-year-
old daughter to boarding school, served as reading stimuli. This
text was chosen for several reasons. First, its length,
i.e., approximately 3000 words, was considered both long
enough to evoke the effects under investigation and short
enough to be read in its entirety during an experimental
session. Second, the story is by a prize-winning literary
author in a highly regarded collection, and previous research
has suggested that literary stories might be especially good at
affecting social cognition (Kidd and Castano, 2013). Third, it
describes both ‘outer events’ (physical happenings) and ‘inner
views’ (how the events are perceived by the protagonist), so that
the content was amenable to manipulations of voice and
focalization. In contrast, manipulating the voice and
focalization of stories dealing exclusively with outer events
would probably have a low impact on the reader, while
changing a story about the inner life of a character to
external focalization would obliterate the vast majority of the
content. Finally, we anticipated that the farewell theme of the
story was relatively familiar to all participants, meaning that
they would in principle be able to identify with the protagonist,
even if inter-individual variation was expected.
The original story represented the third-person narrative with
internal focalization (FID). In addition to that, two adaptations
were created by SF. In one version, the story is told by the
protagonist in the first person with internal focalization. In the
other version, the story is told by an anonymous third-person
narrator using external focalization. Word count was comparable
across the three versions of the story (first-person narrative with
internal focalization: 3127 words; third-person narrative with
internal focalization: 3058 words; third-person narrative with
external focalization: 2962 words). Table 2 exemplifies the use of
perspective and focalization in the three texts; full stimuli are
available on the pre-registration pages, https://osf.io/wpd2c.
Assessment Tasks
Lifetime Exposure to Print
The Author Recognition Test–Genres (Mar and Rain, 2015)
provided an indicator of reading habits. Participants were asked
to accurately recognize the names of 110 fiction and 50 non-fiction
authors (targets) among names of 40 non-authors (foils). A fiction
sub-score was calculated based on the number of correctly identified
fiction authors (possible range: 0–110).
Trait Empathy
In the Empathy Quotient (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004),
40-item version, respondents are asked to indicate the degree to
which they agree with statements, such as “I can easily tell if someone
else wants to enter a conversation”, using a 4-point rating scale that
ranges from strongly disagree to strongly agree. A sum score was
calculated for each respondent, and higher scores indicating greater
levels of empathy (possible range: 0–80). Internal consistency in the
current sample was Cronbach’s α  0.91.
Identification
Participants’ identification with the protagonist was assessed
using a scale adapted from Cohen (2001) that consisted of the
following items, which were rated on a 7-point Likert scale
ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree, and used to
calculate a sum score (possible range: 8–56):
• I was able to understand the events in the story in a manner
similar to that in which the mother, Marjorie5, understood
them.
• I think I have a good understanding of the mother.
3The reading time cut-off was based on an average word reading speed of 239 ms,
reported by Benjamin and Gaab (2012). This yields an average reading duration of
731 s for each text excerpt. Thus, the cut-off of 360 s is just below half of the time an
average reader would need to read the text. This criterion has previously been
applied by Wimmer, Currie, Friend, and Ferguson (submitted).
4Using guesses within Author Recognition Tests as an exclusion criterion is a
common strategy in the field (cf. Kidd and Castano, 2013; Kidd and Castano, 2019;
Kidd et al., 2016; Panero et al., 2016; Samur et al., 2018) as it can indicate a rather
negligent participation style. Excluding participants with more than two guesses is
more rigorous than measures applied in previous experiments (e.g., Kidd and
Castano, 2019) since Moore and Gordon (2015) suggested a higher penalty for
selecting mock authors than originally recommended. Six out of 270 participants
(2.22%) were excluded due to this criterion (cf. Figure 2).
5The character’s name, Marjorie, was mentioned in the first item only to ensure
that respondents associated “the mother” with this character.
Frontiers in Communication | www.frontiersin.org February 2021 | Volume 5 | Article 6119356
Wimmer et al. Narrative Perspective and Social Cognition
• I tend to understand the reasons why the mother did what
she did.
• While reading the story, I could feel the emotions the
mother portrayed.
• During reading, I felt I could really get inside themother’s head.
• At key moments in the story, I felt I knew exactly what the
mother was going through.
• During reading, I wanted the mother to succeed in
managing her emotions.
• When the mother succeeded I felt joy, but when she failed, I
was sad.
In the present sample, internal consistency of this scale was
Cronbach’s α  0.87.







And it was coming nearer, nearer, the moment when I
would have to unwind Patience’s arms from round my
waist and lead her forwards to the barrier. I tried to stand
a bit more upright, but the weight of Patience clinging to
me was implacable, as though I had been roped to the
ground. And I thought, I am bent like an old person, bent
down by the gravity of love [..].
I knew that this now risked to become what Tim would
have called ‘a scene’, and that the other parents would
pity me, or even despise me, for not crushing it the
minute it started, so, with a strength that surprised me, I
grabbed Patience by the fist that had struck me and
turned her round to face the trains and the great vaulted
station roof above them, still black from the years of war.
And it was coming nearer, nearer, the moment when
Marjorie would have to unwind Patience’s arms from
round her waist and lead her forwards to the barrier. She
tried to stand a bit more upright, but the weight of
Patience clinging to her was implacable, as though she
had been roped to the ground. And she thought, I am
bent like an old person, bent down by the gravity of love
[..].
Marjorie knew that this now risked to become what Tim
would have called ‘a scene’, and that the other parents
would pity her, or even despise her, for not crushing it
the minute it started, so, with surprising strength, she
grabbed Patience by the fist that had struck her and
turned the sobbing child round to face the trains and the
great vaulted station roof above them, still black from
the years of war.
And the moment was coming nearer when Marjorie
would have to find a way to unwind Patience’s arms
from round her waist and lead her forwards to the
barrier. Marjorie was making a visible effort to stand a bit
more upright, but the weight of Patience clinging to her
seemed to make this impossible, pulling her back to the
ground. She was bent like an old person, intensifying
her air of misery [..].
This now risked to become ‘a scene’. It is common
knowledge that any mother or father who failed to crush
a scene the minute it started would be pitied, or even
despised, by other parents. Perhaps Marjorie
understood this, because suddenly and with surprising
strength, she grabbed Patience by the fist that had
struck her and turned the sobbing child round to face
the trains and the great vaulted station roof above them,
still black from the years of war.
FIGURE 2 | Flow of participants through Experiment 1.
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Familiarity with Subject Matter
Previous experience with the subject matter of the stories was
assessed using the following items:
• Reflecting on your own life experiences, how familiar were
the events in the story to you? (7-point rating scale ranging
from very unfamiliar to very familiar)6
• Have you ever attended boarding school?
• Has anyone in your family attended boarding school? (if
so, who?)
• As a child were you ever sent away from your family for a
long period of time?
• Are you a parent? (if so, do you have a partner or single?)
• Have you ever experienced a separation from a loved one?
(if yes, please explain)
Transportation
Transportation was operationalized using the 12-item scale
developed by Green and Brock (2000). High levels of
transportation are indicated by a high sum score (possible
range: 12–84). In the present sample internal consistency was
Cronbach’s α  0.73.
Emotion Recognition
Wemeasured emotion recognition using the Reading theMind in
the Eyes Test-Revised (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Better emotion
recognition skills were indexed by a high relative frequency of
correct responses (possible range: 0–1). Although the Reading the
Mind in the Eyes Test-Revised was initially introduced as a
measure of mentalizing, more recently it has been proposed
that it may rather reflect emotion recognition (Oakley et al.,
2016), which is the operationalization we adopt in the present
experiment.
Implicit Morality
First, a word completion task (Bartz and Lydon, 2004) assessed
self-concepts in terms of agency and communion. Six out of 13
word fragments (e.g., _ _ _ erior) could be completed with agency
words (e.g., ‘superior’) or non-agency words (e.g., ‘interior’) and six
word fragments (e.g., _ind) could be completed with communion
words (e.g., ‘kind’) or non-communion words (e.g., ‘mind’); one
word fragment could be completed with either an agency or
communion or non-agency-non-communion word, i.e., c_ _ p_
_ _ tive (‘competitive’, ‘cooperative’, ‘comparative’). Responses
were coded as either a “hit” or a “miss” for the target word. An
agency score (possible range: 0–7) was calculated by summing the
hits to the target words: superior, confident, active, competitive,
boast, greedy, and hostile. A communion score (possible range:
0–7) was computed by summing the hits to target words: kind,
warm, gentle, cooperative, whiny, nag, and dependent. Higher
implicit morality is indicated by a low agency and a high
communion score, respectively.
Second, in the Implicit Affect towards Moral Stimuli task, we
followed the experimental procedure and stimuli applied by
Hofmann and Baumert (2010). In each trial, participants were
asked to categorize a Chinese pictograph as “pleasant” or
“unpleasant” using two response keys on the keyboard. Shortly
before the Chinese pictograph was presented, a moral prime (e.g.,
an elderly couple walking arm-in-arm, or a man directing a gun
into the camera), or control picture (e.g., a lightening striking a
mountain side) appeared for 100 ms. It is assumed that the
affective reaction to the moral primes presented is misattributed
to the Chinese pictograph, thus influencing the response. We used
ten pictures of morally positive behaviors and ten pictures of
morally negative behaviors as moral primes. As comparison
pictures, we included ten non-moral pictures of positive
valence, as well as ten non-moral pictures of negative valence.
Following the procedures of Hofmann and Baumert (2010),
responses exceeding a threshold of 2000ms (3.28% of all
responses) or falling below 350 ms (6.07% of all responses)
were considered outliers and excluded from analyses. To
achieve an indicator of immediate affect towards moral stimuli,
the individual difference index of the Implicit Affect towardsMoral
Stimuli (possible range: 0–1) was calculated for each participant
(cf. Hofmann and Baumert, 2010; proportion of “positive”
judgements on trials in which a Chinese pictograph was
preceded by a positive moral prime minus percentage of
“positive” judgements on trials in which a Chinese character
was preceded by a negative moral prime). To control for
general, morally unrelated affect, the individual differences
index of the IACS (immediate affect towards control stimuli)
was computed (i.e., proportion of “positive” judgements on
trials with positive morality-irrelevant primes minus the
proportion of “positive” judgments on trials with negative
morality-irrelevant primes; possible range: 0-1).
Third, we applied an Implicit Association Test (IAT) of implicit
moral identity (implicit moral identity IAT), replicating the
experimental procedure and stimuli in Perugini and Leone
(2009), and following the standard IAT sequence (Greenwald
et al., 1998). The target categories were “Moral” (represented by
the stimulus words honest, sincere, faithful, modest, altruist) vs
“Immoral” (represented by the stimulus words deceptive, arrogant,
dishonest, cheater, pretentious), and the paired categories were “Me”
(represented by the stimulus words I, me, myself, self, my) vs
“Others” (represented by the stimulus words them, they, others,
your, you). As in Perugini and Leone (2009), implicit moral identity
was indexed by the D6 measure (Greenwald et al., 2003), which is
calculated as the mean latency in the “immoral-me” blockminus the
mean latency in the “moral-me” block, divided by the individual
standard deviation of latencies across “immoral-me” and “moral-
me” blocks. Responses with latencies below 400ms or above
10,000ms were excluded from analysis, and latencies of errors
were replaced by the block mean of correct-response latencies
plus 600ms. Higher scores express a stronger implicit moral self-
concept (possible range: -2-2).
Theory of Mind
A revised version of the Frith-Happé animations task (White
et al., 2011) was used as an indicator of ToM. Participants
6The 6-item battery was used for exploratory purposes; however only the first item
was included in statistical analyses, so that the possible range for the familiarity
score was 1–7.
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watched four video clips depicting animated triangles and
interpreted the interactions between these shapes. Before
presentation of the clips, participants were told that each video
would contain either: no interaction, defined as no obvious
interaction between the triangles, with movement appearing
random; or physical interaction, defined as ‘interaction
between the triangles in which actions are directed toward
each other in order to achieve specific goals’; or mental
interaction, defined as ‘an interaction between the triangles
involving the manipulation of the emotions and thoughts of
one triangle by the other’. Immediately after watching each video,
participants categorized the type of interaction as either no
interaction, physical interaction, or mental interaction by
responding to a multiple choice question. Choosing “mental
interaction” was coded “1”, the remaining choices were coded
“0”, so that the sum score integrating responses to all four video
clips had a potential range of 0 to 4. When mental interaction was
chosen correctly, two further multiple-choice questions probed
details about the feelings of each of the shapes, with one out of five
response options being correct. Correct answers were coded “1”,
errors were coded “0”, resulting in a four-video sum score with a
possible range of 0 to 8.
Procedure
Participants completed all tasks on a computer, starting with a
Qualtrics survey. After giving their informed consent to
participate, respondents completed the Author Recognition
Test–Genres and the Empathy Quotient. Next, participants
were randomly allocated to one of the three reading conditions
(first-person voice with internal focalization vs third-person
voice with internal focalization vs third-person voice with
external focalization). Immediately after reading,
participants answered a comprehension question, “Who do
you think is narrating the story you just read?”, by selecting
one of four response options: the mother (Marjorie); an
anonymous narrator; other (please state); don’t know/do
not wish to answer. Subsequently, participants completed
the Identification and Transportation Scales as well as the
familiarity items. Next, they performed the word completion
task, Frith-Happé animations task, and Reading the Mind in
the Eyes Test-Revised. They were then redirected to the
Inquisit platform to complete the Implicit Affect towards
Moral Stimuli task and implicit moral identity IAT. In
contrast to Qualtrics, Inquisit enables measurement of
reaction times on millisecond level (De Clercq et al., 2003).
Finally, participants were redirected to a Qualtrics survey to
receive written debriefing. The entire experiment took 70 min
to complete, on average.
Data Analysis
All analyses were pre-registered, and the full datasets are available
on the Open Science Framework web pages, https://osf.io/6gsqn/.
We adopted the standard significance level of p< .05 for all
inferential tests. Each task was analyzed separately, with
ANCOVAs that include text (first-person internal vs third-
person internal vs third-person external) as between-subjects













ANCOVA: main effect of text





Word completion task Agency score (possible range: 0–7) 86 3.28 (1.27) 85 3.25 (1.25) 80 3.33 (1.24) 2,
245
0.13 0.879 0.001





MCQ 1: Accuracy sum score (possible
range: 0–4)
86 2.01 (1.09) 85 1.89 (1.06) 80 1.95 (1.07) 2,
245
0.33 0.720 0.003
MCQ 2: Accuracy sum score (possible
range: 0–8)
78 3.17 (1.88) 76 2.97 (1.87) 74 2.96 (1.70) 2,
222
0.22 0.800 0.002
RMET: Relative frequency of correct responses (possible range: 0–1) 85 0.70 (0.14) 85 0.70 (0.17) 79 0.70 (0.15) 2,
243
0.00 0.997 0.000
Implicit affect towards moral stimuli score (possible range: 0–1) 72 0.13 (0.20) 73 0.14 (0.21) 70 0.18 (0.25) 2,
208
0.00 0.998 0.000
Implicit moral identity IAT: D6 (possible range: -2-2) 70 0.66 (0.35) 73 0.70 (0.35) 70 0.71 (0.30) 2,
207
0.28 0.755 0.003
Transportation Scale (possible range: 12–84) 86 58.13 (8.76) 85 56.34 (9.23) 80 56.59 (9.40) 2,
245
1.69 0.188 0.014
Identification Scale (possible range: 8–56) 86 46.56 (6.65) 85 45.35 (7.23) 80 44.89 (7.35) 2,
245
2.08 0.127 0.017














Note. MCQ, multiple choice question; RMET, reading the mind in the eyes test–revised; IAT, implicit association test.
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predictor and the following variables as covariates: fiction sub-
score of the Author Recognition Test–Genres, education level
(operationalized as highest qualification), trait empathy
(operationalized as Empathy Quotient sum score). These
variables were included as covariates since education, expertise
(i.e., lifetime exposure to narrative fiction as reflected by the
Author Recognition Test–Genres fiction sub-score), and trait
empathy are assumed to impact on transportation and
identification (Consoli, 2018). For the Implicit Affect towards
Moral Stimuli task, the IACS score was included as an additional
covariate to control for morally irrelevant affect.
Mediation analyses were calculated using PROCESS macro
(Model 6 with 2 mediators) in SPSS. One mediation was
carried out for each indicator of social/moral cognition,
transportation and identification were considered mediators,
and text was the predictor. The mediation models did not
include covariates since, firstly, this would have reduced
statistical power; and secondly, inclusion of covariates was not
vital for testing our hypothesis regarding the mediational role of
transportation and identification.
Eighty-two missing items values - 81 from the Empathy
Quotient, 1 from the Identification Scale – were imputed with
the individual scale mean on the remaining items.
Results
Main Analyses
For each dependent measure, descriptive statistics and
inferential statistics of the main effect of text are
summarized in Table 3, and the key effects are plotted in
Figure 3. Replicating previous research with the Implicit
Affect towards Moral Stimuli task, participants overall were
significantly more likely to judge a pictograph as pleasant after
a positive moral prime than after a negative moral prime (M 
0.64 vs 0.46; t (299)  12.12, p < 0.001, d  0.68), and were
significantly more likely to judge a pictograph as pleasant after
a positive morality-irrelevant control stimulus than after a
negative morality-irrelevant control stimulus (M  0.70 vs.
0.45; t (296)  16.28, p < 0.001, d  0.95). This supports the
underlying assumption of the Implicit Affect towards Moral
Stimuli task that ratings are biased towards prime valence.
Overall accuracy on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test-
Revised and animations tasks was good (M  70% and 1.94,
respectively), and the positive mean D6 value (M  0.69) in
the moral IAT is consistent with previous research showing a
preference for an implicit moral self-concept. Taken together,
these data confirm that across the tasks, accuracy was
comparable with previous studies, which suggests similar
levels of compliance with instructions.
None of the ANCOVAs revealed a significant effect of text
(ps > 0.10). Looking at the impact of covariates, Empathy Quotient
sum score had a significant effect on the identification scale, F (1,
245)  38.82, p < 0.0001, η2p  0.137, on the transportation scale, F
(1, 245)  34.74, p < 0.0001, η2p  0.124, on the D6 score in the
implicit moral identity IAT, F (1, 207)  4.31, p  0.039, η2p 
0.020, and on the agency score in the word completion task, F (1,
245)  5.63, p  0.018, η2p  0.022. Bivariate correlations
demonstrated that Empathy Quotient was positively related to
each of these outcomes (0.141 < r < 0.347, ps < 0.038).
FIGURE 3 | Pirate plots for main outcome variables of Experiment 1.
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Furthermore, the fiction sub-score of the Author Recognition
Test–Genres had a significant effect on the communion score in
the word completion task, F (1, 245)  4.98, p  0.027, η2p  0.020,
and the IACS score had a significant effect on the Implicit Affect
towards Moral Stimuli score, F (1, 208)  113.75, p < 0.0001, η2p 
0.354. Both covariates were positively correlated with the
respective outcome (rs  0.138 and 0.605, respectively, ps <
0.025). There were no further significant main effects (ps > 0.07).
Mediations were calculated to test whether a potential
relationship between reading narratives and improved social
cognition was mediated by identification with characters and
transportation into the story. Because all 95% confidence
intervals of the indirect effect of story reading on any indicator
of social/moral cognition through identification and transportation
contained zero (95% CI of partially standardized relative indirect
effect that came closest to excluding zero: [−0.0328, 0.090]), there
was no evidence that the effect of reading stories on social cognition
was mediated by identification or transportation.
Exploratory Analyses
Exploratory analyses examined whether the predominant lack of
textual effects was the result of confounds with third variables, in
particular familiarity with subject matter. According to a one-way
ANOVA, participants in the three groups did not report different
levels of familiarity with the subject matter of the text, indicated by
respondents’ answer to “Reflecting on your own life experiences,
how familiar were the events in the story to you?”, p  0.445.
However, familiarity was significantly positively correlated with
transportation, r  0.30, p < 0.0001 (this is in line with a previous
finding by Green, 2004), and identification, r  0.22, p < 0.0001
(and not correlated with remaining outcomes, ps > 0.20), showing
that participants who were more familiar with the subject felt more
transported into events in the text and identified to a greater extent
with the character.
Discussion
Experiment 1 investigated whether the perspective from which
a story is told, both in terms of narrative voice and focalization,
affects readers’ social and moral cognition immediately after
reading. It also tested whether such distal effects are mediated
by proximal outcomes of reading a narrative, in particular
transportation into the story world and identification with the
protagonist.
Hypothesis 1 predicted that performance on social and moral
cognition tasks would be better after reading an internally
focalized narrative than after reading an externally focalized
narrative. This assumption was not supported by the present
data, as none of the indicators of social or moral cognition
differed between the three reading groups (first-person voice
with internal focalization vs third-person voice with internal
focalization vs third-person voice with external focalization).
Hypothesis 2 postulated that the narrative voice in which a story
is told would not influence social or moral cognition. Since none of
the outcomes differed between the three groups, this prediction was
confirmed.
Hypothesis 3 assumed that effects of perspective on social
cognition and morality would be mediated by transportation and
identification with the story’s protagonist. As none of the
mediations revealed indirect effects of transportation or
identification, this hypothesis was not supported.
Interestingly, the most proximal outcomes, i.e., transportation
and identification, were affected by rather stable characteristics,
namely trait empathy and familiarity with subject matter, as
partly predicted by Consoli (2018), hypothesis 6. Possibly,
such trait-level qualities determine more strongly how we are
affected by narratives than textual features such as perspective
and focalization. In that case it would not be surprising that no
effects of the texts on more distal outcomes, such as ToM and
emotion recognition, were observed.
However, the predominant lack of group differences could also
indicate that the three story versions under investigation were not
sufficiently diverse to yield measurable effects, especially regarding
the difference between internal and external focalization. In line
with this assumption, the participants in the external focalization
group had far more difficulty recognizing that their version of the
story was told by an anonymous narrator than participants in the
first-person group had in recognizing that that their version was
told by the mother (18 vs. 1 participants failed the comprehension
check in each condition, respectively; see also Figure 2 and
Participants section above). Apparently, a substantial number of
participants perceived the third-person version with external
focalization to be at least partly told by the mother, even
though the third-person voice clearly indicated that the
protagonist was not the narrator. Taken together, the external
focalization version may not have been sufficiently external, which
could have driven the lack of group differences in both proximal
effects (i.e., transportation, identification) and distal outcomes
(i.e., social and moral cognition). To test this possibility, in
Experiment 2 we further edited the externalized version of the
third-person narrative to reinforce the external focalization. We
then compared this new version with the two internal focalization




The Research Ethics Committee of the School of Psychology at
the University of Kent, United Kingdom, approved the study
prior to its start. Unless otherwise mentioned, methodological
procedures were the same as in Experiment 1.
Participants
The target sample was reached after 334 volunteers. This time, only
nine participants who read the external third-person version of the
story indicated that the story was told by the mother (i.e., participant
failed check of text comprehension; see Figure 4), suggesting that the
measures taken did further externalize this story version. When
exclusion criteria were applied, 262 participants remained in the
final sample, 86 of whom had read the first-person narrative with
internal focalization (60.50% female, mean age  33.63, SD of age 
13.58), 86 who had read the third-person narrative with internal
focalization (65.1% female, mean age  31.47, SD of age  12.24), and
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90 who had read the third-person narrative with external focalization
(60.0% female, mean age  32.86, SD of age  13.34). See Figure 4 for
a schematic of the flow of participants through the experiment.
Reading Stimuli
Again, three versions of Rose Tremain’s short story “The
Closing Door” served as reading stimuli. In addition to the
original third-person narrative with internal focalization and
the first-person version, both of which were used in
Experiment 1, the third-person version using external
focalization used in Experiment 1 was further externalized
by, e.g., referring to the protagonist, not as ‘Marjorie’, but as
‘Patience’s mother’ or ‘the mother’, and removing descriptions
of other characters that mentioned Marjorie’s perspective on
them. The new version now consisted of 2979 words. Table 4
provides an exemplary comparison of the two third-person
versions with external focalization used in Experiment 1 and
Experiment 2; full stimuli are available on the Open Science
Framework, https://osf.io/ef6a5/.
Assessment Tasks
The same measures as in Experiment 1 were applied. The
following internal consistencies were observed in the sample of
Experiment 2: Empathy Quotient: Cronbach’s α  0.88,
Transportation Scale: Cronbach’s α  0.76, Identification Scale:
Cronbach’s α  0.87.
Results
Main Analyses
For each dependent measure, descriptive statistics and
inferential statistics of the main effect of text are summarized
in Table 5, and the key effects are plotted in Figure 5. Fifty-
FIGURE 4 | Flow of participants through Experiment 2.
TABLE 4 | Exemplary comparison of the text stimuli used in Experiments 1 and 2.
third-person narrative, external focalization, used in experiment 1 third-person narrative, external focalization, used in experiment 2
As the bus approached Sloane Square, the women stubbed out their cigarettes and
got up and came swaying along towards Marjorie, smelling of expensive perfume and
of all the smoke they had inhaled. The great blue eyes of Bette stared at Marjorie for a
moment. Later that evening she would whisper toWallis, ‘Wasn’t that the woman with
the caterwauling child at the station? What was she doing on our bus?’ They went
down the stairs and walked away. They did not look up.
Marjorie jumped off the bus just as it was pulling away. She stumbled, but didn’t
fall.
As the bus approached Sloane Square, the women stubbed out their cigarettes and
got up and came swaying along the aisle, smelling of expensive perfume and of all the
smoke they had inhaled. The great blue eyes of Bette stared at Patience’smother for a
moment. Later that evening she would whisper toWallis, ‘Wasn’t that the woman with
the caterwauling child at the station? What was she doing on our bus?’ They went
down the stairs and walked away. They did not look up.
Patience’s mother jumped off the bus just as it was pulling away. She stumbled, but
didn’t fall.
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ANCOVA: main effect of text





Word completion task Agency score (possible range: 0–7) 84 3.40 (1.37) 84 3.67 (1.32) 89 3.28 (1.41) 2,
251
1.86 0.158 0.015





MCQ 1: Accuracy sum score (possible
range: 0–4)
84 1.67 (1.06) 84 2.05 (1.02) 89 2.00 (1.13) 2,
251
2.89 0.058 0.022
MCQ 2: Accuracy sum score (possible
range: 0–8)
72 2.49 (1.46) 78 3.01 (1.64) 79 3.09 (1.60) 2,
223
3.31 0.038 0.029
RMET: Relative frequency of correct responses (possible range: 0–1) 84 0.69 (0.17) 84 0.69 (0.20) 89 0.69 (0.18) 2,
251
0.01 0.986 0.000
Implicit affect towards moral stimuli score (possible range: 0–1) 74 0.20 (0.25) 67 0.15 (0.19) 77 0.20 (0.24) 2,
211
2.09 0.126 0.019
Implicit moral identity IAT: D6 (possible range: -2-2) 68 0.59 (0.38) 65 0.60 (0.35) 73 0.68 (0.30) 2,
200
1.41 0.247 0.014





Identification Scale (possible range: 8–56) 84 46.56 (6.00) 83 47.27 (6.04) 89 45.61 (7.58) 2,
250
0.57 0.569 0.005














Note. MCQ, multiple choice question; RMET, reading the mind in the eyes test–revised; IAT, implicit association test.
FIGURE 5 | Pirate plots for main outcomes variables of Experiment 2.
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seven missing items values - 53 from the Empathy Quotient, 2
from the Identification Scale, 2 from the Transportation Scale -
were imputed with the individual scale mean on the remaining
items. Missing values for 3 further participants - 2 from the
Empathy Quotient, 1 from the Identification Scale - could not be
imputed because more than 20% of scale items were missing.
The respective scales of these participants were omitted from
final analyses.
Replicating previous research with the Implicit Affect
towards Moral Stimuli task, participants overall were
significantly more likely to judge a pictograph as pleasant
after a positive moral prime than after a negative moral
prime (M  0.70 vs. 0.44; t (225)  13.11, p < 0.001, d 
0.84), and were significantly more likely to judge a pictograph
as pleasant after a positive morality-irrelevant control stimulus
than after a negative morality-irrelevant control stimulus (M 
0.63 vs. 0.44; t (225)  12.52, p < 0.001, d  0.83). This supports
the underlying assumption of the Implicit Affect towards
Moral Stimuli task that ratings are biased towards prime
valence. Overall accuracy on the Reading the Mind in the
Eyes Test-Revised and animations tasks was good (M  69%
and 1.89, respectively), and the positive mean D6 value (M 
0.62) in the moral IAT is consistent with previous research
showing a preference for an implicit moral self-concept.
Only one of the ANCOVAs showed a significant effect of
text (all others, ps > 0.05). Specifically, the second set of
multiple choice questions in the animations task, F (2, 223)
 3.31, p  0.038, η2p  0.029, revealed that the internal third-
person version outperformed the first-person version, contrast
estimate  −0.544, SE  0.253, 95%CI [−1.044, −0.045], p 
0.033, but did not differ from the external third-person version,
contrast estimate  −0.043, SE  0.248, 95%CI [−0.532, 0.446],
p  0.863. This pattern suggests that reading a third-person
narrative may have had a greater impact on ToM compared to a
first-person narrative, regardless of focalization.
As to the impact of covariates, Empathy Quotient sum score
had a significant effect on the identification scale, F (1, 250) 
39.89, p < 0.0001, η2p  0.138, on the transportation scale, F (1,
251)  26.11, p < 0.0001, η2p  0.126, and on the first multiple
choice question in the animations task, F (1, 251)  4.17, p 
0.042, η2p  0.016. Bivariate correlations demonstrated that
Empathy Quotient was positively related to each of these
outcomes (0.150 < r < 0.387, ps < 0.016). Furthermore, the
fiction sub score of the Author Recognition Test–Genres had a
significant effect on the percentage of correct responses in the
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test-Revised, F (1, 251)  4.01,
p  0.046, η2p  0.016, and on the second set of multiple choice
questions in the animations task, F (1, 223)  8.80, p  0.003, η2p
 0.038. The Author Recognition Test–Genres fiction sub score
was positively correlated with both outcomes, Reading the
Mind in the Eyes Test-Revised: r  0.065, p  0.065;
animations task: r  0.203, p  0.002, however, correlations
reached significance for the animations task only. The IACS
score had a significant effect on the implicit affect towards
moral stimuli score, F (1, 211)  172.76, p < 0.0001, η2p  0.450,
and was significantly positively correlated with this outcome,
r  0.668, p < 0.0001. There were no further significant main
effects (ps > 0.05).
Mediations were calculated to test whether a potential
relationship between reading stories and improved social
cognition was mediated by identification with characters and
transportation into the story. All 95% confidence intervals of the
indirect effect of story reading on any indicator of social cognition
through identification and transportation contained zero (95% CI
of partially standardized relative indirect effect that came closest
to excluding zero: [−0.0145, 0.0093]), thus the result supported
Experiment 1 in showing no evidence that the effect of reading
stories on social cognition is mediated by identification and
transportation.
Exploratory Analyses
Exploratory analyses examined whether the predominant lack
of textual effects was the result of confounds with confound
variables, especially familiarity with the subject matter (as
in Experiment 1). According to a one-way ANOVA,
participants in the three groups did not differ in this respect,
p  0.444. However, familiarity was significantly positively
correlated with transportation, r  0.30, p < 0.0001, and the
Author Recognition Test–Genres fiction sub score, r  0.14, p 
0.023 (and not correlated with remaining outcomes, ps > 0.15).
Discussion
Experiment 2 tested the same research questions as Experiment 1,
namely whether the perspective from which a written narrative is
told, both in terms of narrative voice and focalization, impacts on
recipients’ levels of general ToM, emotion recognition, and
morality immediately after reading; and whether such distal
effects are mediated by proximal outcomes of reading a
narrative, particularly transportation and identification.
Compared with Experiment 1, Experiment 2 used a stronger
manipulation of focalization for the version of the story with
third-person narration and external focalization. The remaining
methods replicated those used in Experiment 1.
Hypothesis 1 (social and moral cognition would be higher after
reading a narrative told through internal focalization than external
focalization) was again not confirmed. Similar to Experiment 1,
most indicators of social and moral cognition did not differ
between the three reading groups (first-person voice with
internal focalization vs third-person voice with internal
focalization vs third-person voice with external focalization),
and the only significant group difference (i.e., in the animations
task) was that the first-person narrative with internal focalization
scored lower than both third-person versions.
As in Experiment 1, hypothesis 2 (the narrative voice in
which a story is told would not affect social or moral cognition)
was mainly corroborated, since most dependent measures did
not differ between the three groups. However, the only
significant group difference was in contrast to hypothesis 2:
the first-person with internal focalization group scored lower on
the animations task measuring ToM than the third-person with
internal focalization group. Thus, although this effect of voice
did not emerge in Experiment 1, raising the possibility that it
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reflects a false positive, it could suggest that reading a third-
person narrative may have had a greater impact on ToM
compared to a first-person narrative, regardless of focalization.
Paralleling the implication of Experiment 1, hypothesis 3
(effects of perspective on social and moral cognition would be
mediated by transportation and identification with the story’s
protagonist) was rejected because none of the mediations
detected indirect effects of transportation or identification. In
addition, transportation was positively linked with trait empathy
and familiarity with subject matter, and identification (but not
familiarity with subject matter as found in Experiment 1) was
associated with trait empathy.
In summary, despite implementing an even more externalized
version of the external focalization version, which should have
facilitated the detection of focalization-based effects (if there were
any), Experiment 2 failed to observe any benefits of internal over
external focalization. The finding that participants in the third-
person with external focalization group in Experiment 2 were
more likely to recognize that the story was told by an anonymous
narrator than in Experiment 1 (9/101  8.91% of participants in
Experiment 2 vs. 18/104  17.31% of participants in Experiment 1
failed the comprehension check) provides a manipulation check.
It demonstrates that the measures taken to further externalize the
external focalization version served their purpose. Therefore,
Experiment 2 renders it unlikely that the lack of focalization-
based effects in Experiment 1 was due to a lack of contrast
between the three story versions.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
A recent wave of research has suggested that reading narratives
offers a means to improve our social cognition, a set of skills
crucial for everyday interpersonal functioning. These effects are
often associated by theorists in other disciplines with moral
improvement. The present research investigated whether
potential narrative-related benefits for both social and moral
cognition depend on the perspective/voice from which
narratives are told, and the degree to which readers are
transported into the story world and identify themselves with
story characters. The two experiments reported here do not
suggest that perspective has a significant impact on the extent
to which narratives modulate social and moral cognition, either
directly or as an indirect effect of transportation or identification.
Indeed, exploratory analyses using the combined sample from
Experiments 1 and 2 (N  520) also failed to reveal significant
differences between the three texts on our measures of social or
moral cognition, showing that the null effects cannot be explained
by insufficient power to detect a small effect size.
Whilst previous empirical work has investigated narrative
perspective almost exclusively in terms of narrative voice,
despite Genette’s (1980) seminal distinction between
narrative voice and focalization, the present research
manipulated voice and focalization separately to disentangle
the contribution of both aspects. We found no effects of
focalization on either proximal effects (transportation/
identification) or distal outcomes (social/moral cognition). The
null result for identification is inconsistent with the only pre-
existing experiment on focalization by Salem et al. (2017), where
story versions using internal focalization, i.e., first-person and
psycho-narration, were associated with an enhanced tendency
to take the protagonists’ perspective (they did not measure
transportation/social cognition/moral cognition). The divergence
may be explained by several differences between the study by
Salem et al. (2017) and the present experiments. For instance, the
text stimuli used by Salem et al. (2017) were short excerpts whose
length was approximately 15% of the word count of the complete
short stories used in the present experiments. Secondly, Salem et al.
(2017) deployed three measures of perspective-taking: relatedness
(extent to which readers can relate to the protagonist), spatial
perspective-taking, and identification (psychological perspective-
taking). Only the third, identification, overlapped with our study,
where it was measured in a similar though not identical way. But the
effects of internal focalization were almost entirely on the other two
measures, relatedness and spatial point of view, rather than on
identification. Future investigations using a variety of text stimuli
and broad assessments of identification are needed to identify the
conditions under which narrative perspective influences
transportation into the story world and identification with
characters.
In line with our prediction, perspective in terms of narrative
voice did not consistently influence ToM and morality. Only one
dependent measure was affected by narrative voice in one
experiment (and did not replicate across the two experiments),
though the one finding suggested that the first-person narrative
using internal focalization was less effective in enhancing ToM to
the third-person version using internal focalization. Given the
inconsistency on affected outcomes, our results do not support a
robust effect of narrative voice on social or moral cognition.
Finally, the lack of mediation by transportation or
identification could be explained by the non-existent effect of
focalization on more distal outcomes referring to social and
moral cognition. The consequent lack of variation in these
outcomes may have made the detection of mediating effects
more difficult. Nevertheless, the present lack of perspective-
based effects on identification contradicts the notion that
linguistic cues about a character’s point of view facilitate
identification with this character, as predicted by the
Linguistic Cues Framework (van Krieken et al., 2017).
According to this model, stories using internal focalization
should lead to greater identification than external focalization
stories, since the former provide more information about the
character’s mental life than the latter. Hence, the current pattern
of findings encourages a revision of the Linguistic Cues
Framework to achieve a more exhaustive account of the
factors eliciting identification with narrative characters.
The results of our exploratory analyses seem to suggest that
trait-level variables, in particular dispositional empathy, have a
greater impact on identification than textual characteristics, in
particular narrative perspective. In other words, how much
readers identify with a particular story character seems to
depend mainly on readers’ pre-existing level of trait empathy;
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the current results do not show that variations of narrative
perspective have the power to override the influence of trait
empathy, at least if these variations concern a short reading
assignment. Individuals with a strong dispositional tendency
to empathize with others seems to apply this tendency also in
the case of reading a short story, whereas individuals with weak
dispositional empathy apparently also do not tend to
empathize with characters of a short story; the perspective
from which a given story is told does not seem to modulate
such a disposition. This implies that theories of character
identification should include relevant reader traits. It should
however be borne in mind that the effect of trait empathy
observed in the present research was an incidental finding not
related to hypothesis testing. Clearly, targeted investigations
are needed to clarify the role of reader traits vs text properties
within processes of character identification.
This seems particularly desirable in view of similar recent
experiments which observed a stronger impact of rather stable
reader traits on experience and processing of narratives than
state-level variables, i.e., narrative voice of reading stimuli and
mental imagery instructions during reading, respectively
(Hartung et al., 2017a; Mak et al., 2020). The available
evidence suggests that the effects of reading short narratives is,
to a relatively large degree, determined by pre-existing reader
traits, and less so, if at all, by state variables including textual
variations. Mischel’s (1977) concept of situation strength may
provide an explanation for this pattern, if we consider reading
short stories as “weak situations”. Mischel’s (1977) introduced the
concept of situation strength to explain whether behavior is
shaped by stable personality traits (applied to the current
experiments: trait empathy) or temporary situational
influences (applied to the current experiments: reading a short
story told from a certain narrative perspective). According to
Mischel, situational impact is crucial in strong situations, which
“lead everyone to construe the particular events the same way,
induce uniform expectancies regarding the most appropriate
response pattern, provide adequate incentives for the
performance of that response pattern and require skills that
everyone has to the same extent” (p. 347). In contrast,
behavior is assumed to be determined by personality traits in
weak situations, which “are not uniformly encoded, do not
generate uniform expectancies concerning desired behavior, do
not offer sufficient incentives for its performance, or fail to
provide the learning conditions required for successful genesis
of behavior” (p. 347). Future work could explore this explanatory
approach, for instance by investigating whether the impact of
state variables, e.g., textual properties, increases with increasing
length of reading assignments (i.e., when situational impact is
strengthened).
Taken together, the present results do not support the
proposal that either narrative voice or perspective/
focalization underlies the benefits, if any, of reading
narratives for social and moral cognition. Since we applied
the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test, the indicator of social
cognition most frequently used in previous experiments
observing narrative-based benefits for social cognition (cf.
Table 1), we can rule out that the null effects trace back to
the use of incomparable measures. There is also no evidence in
our study to suggest that transportation or identification
mediate the relationship between reading narratives and
ToM/moral cognition. However, these findings may be
limited by the stimulus texts and measurement instruments
applied.
The pre-existing evidence for immediate effects of reading
a story on social cognition has been relatively weak (Dodell-
Feder and Tamir, 2018). However, even if such effects exist,
they are unlikely to be produced by all stories (e.g. Mar, 2018).
So it is possible that the story used in the current experiments
was not suitable to evoke the effects under investigation.
Future research should consider a broader spectrum of
textual stimuli and dimensions of identification, which may
provide a more complete picture of the conditions under
which narratives foster our social cognition. Still, one
would assume that if text features such as voice and
focalization have an effect, they should do so in more than
one type of story.
CONCLUSION
Two experiments consistently showed that narrative
perspective, either in terms of narrative voice or
focalization, did not influences readers’ social or moral
cognition, either directly, or indirectly via transportation
into the story world or identification with the protagonist.
Narrative perspective also did not affect transportation or
identification. This suggests that the short-term benefits of
reading fictional narratives found by other studies may not
have been reliant on perspective. Furthermore, the present
findings cast doubt on models that propose a central role of
narrative perspective for identification with a story character;
instead, the current pattern points to the possibility that reader
traits, especially empathy, could determine identification to a
greater extent than narrative perspective. These possibilities
should be tested in future research. In addition, we encourage
studies that assess multiple dimensions of identification and
employ a broad range of stimulus texts to facilitate
generalization of claims.
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